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It would be anachronistic, at the very least, to attribute to Aquinas a theory of 
mental language. As historians of philosophy seem to agree, and I will not 
question, it is only after Aquinas that thinkers elaborated theories of mental 
language, or of a “language of thought,” with attempts to provide a linguistic 
(especially semantic and syntactic) analysis of cognition: fi rst within the project 
of later medieval nominalism, and more recently (and apparently independently) 
by thinkers in contemporary analytic philosophy (foremost Jerry Fodor).1
Nonetheless, allowing that we do not fi nd a recognizable theory of mental 
language to Aquinas, I want to consider the sense in which it is appropriate to 
attribute to Aquinas some conception of “mental language,” and then to explore 
whether, given that conception, a Thomistic theory of mental language would 
be possible, and, if so, what it might look like and how it would differ from more 
familiar versions. For, as will become clear, Aquinas did regard cognition as 
having certain language-like qualities; but as I also hope to show, given his 
particular understanding of cognition, there are reasons why a syntactic and 
semantic analysis of the “language” of thought in a Thomistic framework would 
have only limited similarities to what we recognize in other thinkers as theories 
of mental language. I will begin, then, with a brief review of some of the features 
of mental language theory as developed explicitly in medieval nominalism and 
in contemporary analytic philosophy, in relation to which we can then better 
appreciate the distinctiveness of Aquinas’s own attention to the language-like 
features of thought.
mental language: nominalist and contemporary 
analytic versions
Ockham is usually recognized as the fi rst to have developed a theory of mental 
language. Other thinkers before him had, for various theological and philo-
sophical reasons, treated some aspects of thought as language-like, but, in the 
1. An exception to this general historical consensus is Peter King, “Abelard on Mental 
Language,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007): 169–187. Claude Panaccio 
has responded to this in “Mental Language and Predication: Ockham and Abelard,” Ana-
lytica 14 (2010): 183–194.
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words of Claude Panaccio, who has traced this history, “Ockham’s originality 
in the history of the idea of mental language is to have systematically transposed 
to the analysis of non-linguistic discursive thought the grammatical and seman-
tic categories that the science of his time employed in the study of oral or writ-
ten language.”2
Ockham’s development of a theory of mental language was, if not determined 
by, at least fostered within, his nominalist project. Desiring to preserve the 
universality of scientifi c knowledge without a commitment to universal objects, 
Ockham found it attractive to take propositions, rather than common natures, 
as objects of knowledge, for even universal propositions could be verifi ed, on 
Ockham’s nominalist semantics, by reference only to particular individuals in 
the world. But if they were to transcend the particularity of individual language 
communities, the universal propositions which are the objects of scientifi c 
knowledge could be not just tokens in spoken and written language but items 
of a “mental language,” which is “not in any language,” that is, an interior 
language of the mind not bound by conventional oral or written expression and 
therefore in principle common to all human beings.3
In the mature form of Ockham’s theory, the components of mental language, 
its terms and expressions, are not some objects of intellectual acts, but the very 
intellectual acts themselves. Whether, for Ockham, these intellectual acts or 
concepts can be said to represent or be similar to their objects, or whether their 
direct causal connection to their objects can be described apart from, and even 
in opposition to, a “representation” or similitude relation, is a controverted 
point,4 but what is undeniable is that Ockham’s articulation of a theory of 
mental language, taken up by later nominalists, allowed for the development 
of a sophisticated semantic analysis of cognition while upholding the charac-
teristic nominalist goal: in this case, to restrict both the objects and the appa-
ratus of cognition to concrete individuals (and to no more concrete individuals 
than was necessary).
In recent analytic philosophy, Jerry Fodor and other theorists have defended 
a “language of thought hypothesis,” according to which, as for Ockham, thought 
is language-like in having a compositional structure and bearing semantic prop-
2. Claude Panaccio, Le discourse intérieur de Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham (Paris: Édi-
tions de Seuil, 1999), 278.
3. Ibid., 256.
4. For a variety of positions see, for instance, ibid., chap. 8; Peter King, “Rethinking Rep-
resentation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental Represen-
tation,” in Representation and Objects of Thought, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005), 83–102; and Gyula Klima, “Ockham’s Semantics and Metaphysics of the Categories,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P. V. Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 118–142.
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erties.5 Contemporary theorists tend to join this general position to further 
commitments, identifying mental states with physical states in the brain, and 
regarding the language of thought as innate, perhaps genetically determined.6 
These physicalist and nativist assumptions indicate something of the underly-
ing motivations of contemporary “language of thought” theories, with their 
connections to the project of cognitive psychology; but arguably they are not 
strictly speaking essential to a language of thought hypothesis.7
These are brief outlines that do not do justice to the details of the theories, 
nor to the varieties that they have taken in particular medieval and contempo-
rary authors, but they are suffi cient to lead us to expect that Aquinas would not 
have a theory of mental language. For a simple, not to say simplistic, version 
of Aquinas’s view is that intellectual cognition involves the form or nature of 
a thing being received immaterially in the mind. This immaterial-reception-of-
forms account seems to share very little of (indeed, seems directly at odds with) 
the theoretical frameworks that have fostered the development of historical 
mental language theories: materialist functionalism for Fodor, and aversion to 
extra entities like natures distinct from their individuals for the nominalists.
Nonetheless, this is not enough to help us understand why Aquinas did not 
develop his own, alternative theory of mental language—after all, we have not 
presented any reasons why an approach to thought as somewhat language-like 
(and thus as susceptible to semantic and syntactic analysis) must have a par-
ticular motive or take place within a framework of particular theoretical assump-
tions. Furthermore, the immaterial-reception-of-forms account of Aquinas’s 
view that I have given is indeed too simplistic. The real story for Aquinas is 
more complicated and subtle. Telling it and working out some of its details will 
allow us to clarify the roles of representation, intentionality, mediation, and 
other notions central to Aquinas’s account of intellectual cognition, and will 
also prepare us to develop a more nuanced appreciation of how the notion of 
“mental language” can apply to Aquinas’s approach to cognition.
5. The founding text is Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1975). For an overview and other references, see Murat Aydede, “The Lan-
guage of Thought Hypothesis,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/language-thought.
6. Cf. Aydede, sections 1 and 4.
7. Ibid. An assumption apparently more central to contemporary mental language theo-
ries is that of “mental representationalism” in the sense typical of modern empiricism: that 
we know things in the external world only by attending to mental phenomena that somehow 
represent those things. But there is some question as to how “externalist” or “internalist” 
the implied representationalism must be. Fodor has apparently developed his view on this 
point.
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works of the mind
As is well known, Aquinas adopts from Aristotle a view of intellectual cognition 
that is derived from his hylomorphist conception of nature and the soul. Natu-
ral objects are composites of form and matter, and a cognitive being is one whose 
substantial form or soul endows that being with the power to receive the forms 
of things, without the matter of those things, in a manner that makes that being 
aware of those things. Different kinds of cognitive powers—sensation, imagina-
tion, intellectual understanding—involve the reception of forms in different 
manners. What makes sensation different from intellectual understanding is 
that it is directed to particular physical individuals, while intellectual under-
standing is universal, common, or general.
While intellectual and sensitive powers can exist independently of each other 
(in angels and brutes, respectively), in human beings they not only exist 
together, but one (intellectual cognition) is crucially dependent on the other 
(sensation). Natural forms, as they exist in things, are sensible, but not imme-
diately intelligible—they have to be made intelligible by being abstracted from 
all their individuating material conditions. This is the work of the agent intellect, 
whose role is to operate on the phantasms received in the imagination that are 
derived from the sensible forms received through the senses. The agent intellect 
isolates the universal intelligible features of the forms, thus making them avail-
able for intellectual cognition. This is the abstraction of the intelligible species.
But the intelligible species is not yet actually understood, and is not the object 
of intellectual cognition. It is intelligible, that is, able to be understood, but as 
intelligible species it is not yet actually understood. The agent intellect, having 
abstracted it from the phantasm, deposits it in the possible intellect, where it 
serves, in the phrase of David Braine, as a “standing intellectual capacity.”8 
Informing the possible intellect, the intelligible species can serve as the formal 
principle for the action of the intellect that forms a concept by which an object 
is understood.
This last sentence is carefully phrased. The intelligible species can serve as 
the formal principle for the action of the intellect that forms a concept by which 
an object is understood. Aquinas carefully insists that we must not confuse the 
four elements or moments of intellectual cognition suggested by this descrip-
tion: the intelligible species, the act of intellect, the concept, and the object of 
understanding. As Aquinas puts it in the De Potentia Dei:
Now the one who understands may have a relation to four [things] in under-
standing: namely to the thing understood, to the intelligible species whereby 
his intelligence is made actual, to his act of understanding, and to his intel-
8. David Braine, “The Active and Potential Intellects: Aquinas as a Philosopher in His 
Own Right,” in Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions, 
ed. John Haldane (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 22.
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lectual concept. This concept differs from the three others. It differs from the 
thing understood, for the latter is sometimes outside the intellect, whereas 
the intellectual concept is only in the intellect. Moreover the intellectual 
concept is ordered to the thing understood as its end, inasmuch as the intel-
lect forms its concept thereof that it may know the thing understood. It 
differs from the intelligible species, because the latter which makes the intel-
lect actual is considered as the principle of the intellect’s act, since every agent 
acts forasmuch as it is actual: and it is made actual by a form, which is neces-
sary as a principle of action. And it differs from the act of the intellect, 
because it is considered as the term of the action, and as something effected 
thereby.9
The account in this famous and diffi cult passage has elicited two related 
objections: First, that it is too complicated, involving too many entities—espe-
cially, in addition to the act and object of intellect, the intelligible species and 
the concept; and second, that these added entities introduce unnecessary steps 
of “mediation”—some of these entities seem to serve instrumentally as repre-
sentations of the others. These objections are behind typical nominalist criticisms 
of the Thomistic picture, charging Thomism with a profl igate mental represen-
tationalism in comparison with the true, economical “direct realism” of 
nominalism,10 and some who would defend Aquinas’s treatment of cognition 
would rather ignore this passage as uncharacteristic. I think that the objections 
can be handled without dismissing this passage.
In anticipation of the fi rst objection, I have called the four items Aquinas dis-
cusses here “moments” or “elements” in cognition, in order to avoid making them 
sound like things. I think it is clear that these are not four res; they are distinct, 
and must not be confused, but we do not have to fi nd here four “entities.”
Now it is not controversial to say that the object—or what in later medieval 
philosophy came to be called the objective concept11—differs from the other 
three elements, for it is what is understood, while the other three are not what 
is understood but some part of the process of understanding. These other three 
elements are connected: the concept (or what is sometimes called the formal 
concept), while not identical with the act of intellect, is its terminus, since the 
act of intellect is the action which forms the quality of mind (the formal concept) 
by which the objective concept is grasped; and the intelligible species, while 
identical with neither the formal concept nor the act of intellect, is their formal 
principle.
If this helps to clear Aquinas of the charge of having too many things 
involved in cognition, I also think that it helps to clear Aquinas of the charge 
9. Disp. Q. de Potentia Dei, q. 8, a. 1.
10. Cf. Panaccio, Le discourse intérieur, ch. 6.
11. See Gyula Klima’s contribution to this volume.
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of having “mediating representations” that make the thinking subject attend 
to something internal, rather than to the external object of thought. Aquinas 
is emphatic that the intelligible species and the (formal) concept are not what 
is understood, not the object of intellection. We do not attend to them, and then 
conclude something about the world by a kind of inferential step. Instead, they 
are the principles by which we can attend to objects. Of course, in describing 
the “mechanics” of cognition, I may attend to these principles, and make them 
objects of thought—as when doing logic or philosophical psychology. But in 
thinking of dogs, I don’t think of my (formal) concept of dog; I think about the 
canine nature.12
I N T E N T I O I N T E L L E C T U S , representation, mediation
At this point, however, more needs to be said about mediation and representa-
tion. For clearly the concept does mediate understanding and signifi cation—I 
understand a thing by means of my concept of it, and I can signify that thing 
because a word can signify the concept immediately, and by its mediation signify 
the thing of which it is a concept. This does not mean that the signifi cation of 
things is indirect, only that my directly signifying and understanding a thing 
cannot take place without a concept. An intellectual subject’s relationship to an 
understood object is necessarily mediated by his cognitive states—by his inten-
tions or concepts. Even nominalism’s alleged “direct realism” cannot avoid this 
kind of mediation. The (formal) concept’s mediation of understanding certainly 
does not entail that the intellectual agent only knows by inferences from intro-
spection, that there is something that stands in the way of direct contact with 
the world, or that the mind is immediately occupied only with its own concepts. 
The mind is occupied with the things it conceives, by means of (formal) concepts. 
This should serve to clear Thomas of the charge of “mental representationalism” 
in the modern sense we associate with British empiricism.13
But it must be further acknowledged that Aquinas says that the concept 
represents its object. The concept “by which our intellect understands a thing 
distinct from itself originates from another and represents another.”14 What can 
Thomas mean by “represent” in such a claim? What sort of “representation” 
12. For a recent detailed discussion of the role of the intelligible species, see Yves Floucat, 
L’intimé fecondité de l’intelligence: Le verbe mental selon saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Téqui, 
2001), especially chap. 3. On the development of Aquinas’s treatment of the concept and 
intelligible species, see also Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Intellection,” 
Études Maritainiennes/Maritain Studies 11 (1995): 220–233.
13. For an extended treatment differentiating Aquinas on cognition from contemporary 
mental representationalism, see John O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: 
Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2003).
14. “Huiusmodi ergo conceptio, sive verbum, qua intellectus noster intelligit rem aliam 
a se, ab alio exoritur, et aliud repraesentat.” De Pot. 8.1. Cf. In Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, c.; d. 8, q. 
2, a. 1d, ad 1.
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does he have in mind, and in what sense is it serving to represent? In “mental 
representationalism” commonly understood, a representation is what is directly 
attended to, and the representation is somehow a physical likeness or depiction 
of what it represents. We have already seen that Aquinas does not share the 
fi rst assumption. He also does not share the second; a concept cannot represent 
in the way that a picture or a mental image, a phantasm, represents, for as an 
immaterial quality it cannot physically represent, or have a physical similitude 
to, anything at all.
Even apart from immaterial intellectual intentions, in general for Aquinas 
a representing thing need not physically resemble the object it represents. The 
representing thing may encode the represented thing in a different medium, 
as pits in the surface of a CD that encode but do not physically resemble the 
sounds that make up a song.15 On this understanding, any instance of what 
Aquinas calls an “intentional” reception of a form is a “representation.” Such 
an “intentional” reception, in Aquinas’s sense, does not imply a cognitive sub-
ject; it implies the reception of a form in a mode other than that appropriate to 
its natural being.
Presumably, then, every intentional reception of a form is a representation. 
Something represents to the degree that it has the power to manifest or make 
known, not necessarily to the extent that it depicts.16 An intentional reception 
of a form is an encoding of a form, and it represents to the extent that it could 
be decoded. The concept’s “representation” of its object is due to its formal 
principle, the intelligible species, which directs the intellect to its object, the 
nature. We might say that it is an “encoding” of the species, an intentional 
reception of the form, in such a way as to direct the intellect to its object. 
Informed by the intelligible species, the intellect is able to produce an intention 
that directs it toward the nature of which the intelligible species is the formal 
principle. The concept is thus also called by Thomas the intentio intellectus—
an intentio, in the sense that it is an intentional reception of a form, that is, 
a reception of the form in something other than the matter proper to that 
form’s natural being; and it is an intentio intellectus, because in this case it is 
received in an intellect, and is that by which the intellect actually under-
stands—in other words, it is the kind of intentio that directs an intellect to an 
object of understanding.17
15. The example is from the more extended discussion in Klima, “Tradition and Innovation 
in Medieval Theories of Mental Representation,” Proceedings of the Society for Medieval 
Logic and Metaphysics 4 (2004): 4–11.
16. This point is made very clearly in David Braine, “The Active and Potential Intellects.”
17. See Max Herrera, “Understanding Similitudes in Aquinas with the Help of Avicenna 
and Averroes,” Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 5 (2005): 
4–17, esp. 11: “A species is a type of form that intentionally specifi es and determines its 
subject by communicating a ratio, also known as an intentio, to its subject. The ratio or 
intentio is a formal characteristic that intentionally specifi es and determines its subject.”
18541-Klima_Intentionality.indd   35 5/28/14   8:03 PM
36 joshua p. hochschild
So for Aquinas the concept mediates thought and signifi cation because it is 
a representation of its object, a special kind of representation in an intellectual 
agent which makes that agent aware of an intellectual object—and we can say 
this without implicating him in the diffi culties of “mental representationalism” 
with its mediated entities separating the knower from the world.
V E R B U M M E N T I S
Further indication that Aquinas considered thought to be language-like is his 
explicit treatment of concepts as mental words. In some of the passages discussed 
above, and many others in Aquinas, another term for the concept or intentio 
intellectus is mental word (verbum mentis)—occasionally interior word (verbum 
interius) or word of the heart (verbum cordis).18 This “word” terminology is 
usually presented as synonymous with the other terminology of concept and 
intentio intellectus.19 Obviously the terms “concept,” “intentio,” and “verbum 
mentis” do not have the same connotation, but for Aquinas they all pick out 
the same element in the analysis of cognition—indeed, all three are used not 
just of simple concepts, resulting from the fi rst act of intellect, but of complex 
concepts or judgments, propositions formed by the second intellectual act of 
combination and division.20
In calling the concept a “verbum,” the obvious connation, in addition to 
linguistic, is theological—in the Latin translation of the Gospel of John, “ver-
bum” is the name for the second person of the Trinity, and Christian theologians 
before Aquinas—especially Augustine—had already attempted to tease out an 
appropriate analogy between the procession or expression of the Divine Logos 
in God and the formation of a concept or “inner word” in the human intellect. 
This theological inspiration might suggest that Aquinas’s characterization of 
the concept as a verbum is not especially relevant to his philosophical account 
of cognition. So, for instance, reviewing the context and signifi cance of Aquinas’s 
employment of the term “verbum mentis,” John O’Callaghan has concluded 
that “the verbum mentis plays no philosophical role in St. Thomas, but is rather 
a properly theological discussion. It has the theological purpose of providing 
18. On Aquinas’s use of verbum, two classic treatments are Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: 
Word and Idea in Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967) and Henri 
Paissac, Théologie du verbe (Paris: Cerf, 1951). See also Floucat, L’intimé fecondité de 
l’intelligence, and William W. Meissner, “Some Aspects of the Verbum in the Texts of St. 
Thomas,” The Modern Schoolman 36 (1958): 1–30. Dewan, “St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual 
Intellection,” mentions some other relevant scholarship.
19. Aquinas occasionally distinguishes between the verbum cordis and an interior verbum 
which is an image of the vocal word, apparently out of greater deference to Augustine’s use 
in De Trinitate. Cf. DV 4.1 and Sent. 27.2.1.
20. E.g Quod. Quest., Quod. 5, q. 5, a. 2, c.
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nothing more than an image or metaphor for talking about man, made in the 
image and likeness of God as Trinity.”21
O’Callaghan is moved to argue for this against several thinkers who have 
treated the notion of verbum mentis as if it were the key to Aquinas’s philo-
sophical psychology. O’Callaghan is right that we have no reason to take the 
notion of verbum mentis as the starting point, or central feature, of Aquinas’s 
account of intellectual cognition, especially since, as O’Callaghan notes, the 
“verbum mentis” terminology does not appear in Aquinas’s most developed 
philosophical treatments of cognition: Disputed Questions on the Soul, the De 
Anima and De Interpretatione commentaries, and questions 75–89 of the 
Summa Theologiae (prima pars). Instead, the term “verbum mentis” tends to 
appear in explicitly theological contexts and, given its relation to the divine 
Verbum, it is reasonable to infer that the notion of “verbum mentis” always 
retains for Aquinas some of its Christian theological connotations.
Nonetheless, it does not follow that the phrase “verbum mentis” is an item 
of purely theological, as opposed to properly philosophical, discourse, and we 
do not have to conclude with O’Callaghan that the notion of the verbum plays 
no properly philosophical role, and serves only as a theological metaphor. First 
of all, a theological metaphor (or analogy) still depends on the natural meanings 
of terms—or else there is no way to connect revelation to what is known from 
natural knowledge.22 Calling God a “Word” does not reveal anything to us 
unless we can already import something of what we know of the word (or ratio 
or logos) apart from revelation, as well as import something of what we learn 
from revelation to enlighten what we naturally know of words.
Second, the “theological” connotation of “verbum mentis” is not solely a 
matter of Christian sacra doctrina but also of natural theology. In addition to 
the obvious connection to the Second Person of the Trinity, there is an important 
connection to the classical philosophical notion of a divine mind that conceives 
ideas. The extended treatment of the verbum mentis in De Veritate, q. 4, for 
instance, seems at least as indebted to the Neoplatonic desire to describe God 
as a divine mind with ideas as it is to the properly Christian interest in fi nding 
an image of the divine Trinity in man.
Furthermore, it seems worthwhile to pay attention to the direction in which 
the metaphor (or analogy) of human concept and Divine Verbum is supposed 
21. John O’Callaghan, “Verbum Mentis: Philosophical or Theological Doctrine in Aqui-
nas?” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 74 (2000): 103–119. 
O’Callaghan’s thesis and arguments are explored further in subsequent exchange: James C. 
Doig, “O’Callaghan on Verbum Mentis in Aquinas,” American Catholic Philosophical Quar-
terly 77 (2003): 233–255, and John O’Callaghan, “More Words on the Verbum: A Response 
to James Doig,” ibid., 257–268.
22. Many articles on analogy could be mentioned here, but I will cite a more subtle and 
lesser known one: Alasdair MacIntyre, “Which God Ought We to Obey, and Why?” Faith 
and Philosophy 3 (1986): 359–371.
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to move. From O’Callaghan’s critique, we might assume that we know fi rst that 
God has/is a “Word” which God conceives and expresses, and it is only by 
comparing our mind and its concepts with this that we may call our concepts 
“words.” However, Aquinas seems to think that the analogy stretches in the 
other direction: “Our intellectual word . . . enables us to speak about the divine 
Word by a kind of resemblance.”23
Why do we call the inner word a “word,” according to Aquinas? Not because 
it is like the Divine Word, since the Divine Word is called a “word” because of 
its resemblance to the inner word. The inner word, it turns out, is so called 
because of its relation to the exterior, vocal word:
We give names to things according to the manner in which we receive our 
knowledge from things. . . . Consequently, since the exterior word is sensible, 
it is more known to us than the interior word; hence, according to the appli-
cation of the term, the vocal word is meant before the interior word, even 
though the interior word is naturally prior, being the effi cient and fi nal cause 
of the exterior.24
In other words, by order of imposition, the term “word” belongs fi rst to the 
vocal word and is extended then to the interior word or concept, which is more 
primarily a word in the order of nature (and so from it the term “word” can be 
extended to the Divine Word—which, presumably, is even more primary in the 
metaphysical order, but remains last in the order of imposition).25
This position in De Veritate is consistent with what we learn from the Summa 
Theologiae about the notion of “word,” its order of imposition and natural order. 
First, the notion of word is extended from vocal word to concept, insofar as the 
concept issues from a power (the intellect) and directs us toward something else 
(the object of understanding):
whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds 
something within us, which is a conception of the thing understood, a con-
ception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowl-
edge of that thing. This conception is signifi ed by the spoken word, and it is 
called the word of the heart signifi ed by the word of the voice.26
23. DV 4.2. Presumably this, and not something heretical, is what John Poinsot (John of 
St. Thomas) means when he says that the mental word is the principal reason that explains 
(praecipuam rationem explicandi) the Divine Verbum (cited in O’Callaghan, “Verbum Men-
tis”). That is, the mental word is not a rational principle that makes possible a philosophical 
demonstration of a mystery, but a rational principle by reference to which the mystery of 
the Second Person of the Trinity can be expounded.
24. DV 4.1.
25. Cf. DV 4.1 ad 5.
26. ST Ia.27.1, corpus.
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But the concept, while called a “word” later in the order of imposition, by its 
nature deserves the name more properly, as being cause of the vocal sound’s 
being a word:
The vocal sound, which has no signifi cation, cannot be called a word; where-
fore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact that it signifi es 
the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that fi rst and chiefl y, 
the interior concept of the mind is called a word.27
To be sure, the larger context of both of these quoted passages is Trinitarian 
theology (q. 27 treats the Procession of the Divine Persons, q. 34 the Person of 
the Son). But within this larger theological context, the immediate dialectical 
context of the quoted passages is dedicated to articulating why the different 
things that we call words, vocal and mental words, are so called; and that is not 
done by reference to revealed Trinitarian doctrine but, in typical Aristotelian 
fashion, by reference to the order of natural knowledge.28
If we look at another passage, as well, its larger theological context should 
not blind us to the immediate dialectical trajectory. Treating the notion of Eter-
nal Law, Aquinas responds to an objection that law, which must be promulgated 
by word, must be related to one Person of the Trinity rather than to the essence 
of God as a whole. Aquinas’s response begins by clearing up why we call dif-
ferent things words:
27. ST Ia.34.1 corpus.
28. Consider Aquinas’s refl ections in another undeniably theological context, comment-
ing on the Gospel of John (chap. 1, lect. 1, sections 25–29 of Super Evangelium S. Ioannis 
lectura). Aquinas begins by saying that to understand the name “verbum” as it occurs in the 
fi rst verse, we need to understand its natural sense. Citing Aristotle’s account of words as 
signs of “passions in the soul,” Aquinas explains that naturally speaking “word” refers to 
both the external (vocal) word and to that of which the external word is a sign, namely the 
internal word (verbum interius, also called here conceptio mentis, or even simply ratio) formed 
by the act of understanding. Thus, even if the external word is what is called “word” fi rst in 
the order of imposition, the internal (mental) word is prior in the order of causality, as provid-
ing that which gives the external word its signifi cation. The interior word is what is formed 
by an intellect when it understands, including both the fi rst and second acts of intellect—that 
is, not only simple concepts but also judgments are a kind of interior speech. Aquinas can 
thus establish that an interior word is necessarily linked to an intellectual nature, and not as 
the activity of that nature but as what intellectual activity forms in the act of understand-
ing—the word is not that by which the intellect understands but that in which it understands. 
Interestingly, Aquinas’s fi rst illustration of the divine word is not an explicit reference to the 
second Person of the Trinity as such, but to the creative act of God in Genesis, by speech; and 
Aquinas only begins to approach what looks like the recognizably Christian notion of the 
divine Word as the second Person of the Trinity through subsequent refl ections on how the 
divine Word must differ from words uttered by other intellectual natures, given the unique-
ness of the divine nature. At no point in this discussion does Aquinas take something that we 
know by faith about the Son to illuminate what we mean by “mental word”; rather, he refl ects 
on the nature of the mental word to establish the appropriateness of speaking of a divine 
Verbum.
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With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz., the word 
itself, and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken word is some-
thing uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signifi ed by 
the human word. The same applies to the human mental word, which is 
nothing else than something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses 
mentally that which he thinks about.29
Aquinas does continue by clarifying the sense in which what is conceived by 
the intellect of God is a Word, but this does not imply that when we speak of 
mental words we are working with a merely “theological” metaphor that extends 
to the realm of the human mind a revealed name of the Second Person of the 
Trinity. Rather, the logic here, as elsewhere, seems to present talk of the Divine 
Word as (at least in part) a semantic or psychological metaphor (or analogy) 
relating the Son to intellectual conceptions. In short, these passages suggest 
that a concept is not called an inner word because it is somehow like the second 
Person of the Trinity, but because it is like an exterior word, in being expressed 
by something and in turn expressing something else.30
On the basis of these refl ections, it is fair to say that in characterizing the 
concept as a “verbum,” Aquinas wants to highlight the following things about 
human thought: fi rst, concepts behave like words in that they represent, and 
second, that they are a kind of utterance or “expression” by the mind that 
remain within the mind.
Thomas is even willing to say that these representing expressions signify, 
and so they deserve to be called signs—as in this passage from De Veritate:
The nature of a sign belongs more properly to an effect than to a cause when 
the cause brings about the existence of the effect but not its meaning, as is 
the case in the example given. But when the effect has derived from its cause, 
not only its existence, but also its meaning, then this cause is prior to the 
effect both in existence and in meaning. Hence, signifi cation and manifesta-
tion belong more properly to the interior than to the exterior word [verbum 
interius per prius habet rationem signifi cationis quam verbum exterius], for 
29. ST Ia–IIae 93.1 ad 2.
30. Of course, it may still be the case that the notion of the Son of God as the Divine Word 
gives the Christian a particular reason to make and exploit this comparison of mental and 
vocal word. Aware that we will try to understand the Divine Word by its comparison with 
the human mental word, the notion of the verbum mentis might always retain, for a Chris-
tian theorist, a theological connotation. (In clarifying the distinction between formal and 
objective concept, Cajetan admits that calling the formal concept a “word” is more a theo-
logical than philosophical way of talking: “Conceptus formalis est idolum quoddam quod 
intellectus possibilis format in seipso repraesentativum objectaliter rei intellectae: quod a 
philosophis vocatur intentio seu conceptus, a theologis vero verbum.” Commentaria in De 
Ente et Essentia, §14.) But that does not make the content of this notion theological as opposed 
to philosophical.
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whatever meaning the exterior word has been adopted to convey is due to 
the interior word.31
Aquinas’s point in this passage is that thoughts or concepts have semantic 
properties (they are signs) and are appropriately—even more primarily—called 
“words” insofar as they represent or signify objects and are the foundation or 
cause of the representation or signifi cation of uttered words. The priority of the 
signifi cation of the mental word over the spoken word is manifest in a similar 
passage from the same work, where we learn that even angels (who have no 
uttered speech) can be said to know by means of signs:
A thing cannot be called a sign in the proper sense unless one can come to 
know something else as if by reasoning from it. In this sense, signs do not exist 
among angels, because, as we proved in the previous question, angels’ knowl-
edge is not discursive. The signs we use are sensible, because our knowledge, 
which is discursive, has its origin in sense-objects. But we commonly call any-
thing a sign which, being known, leads to the knowledge of something else; 
and for this reason an intelligible form can be called a sign of the thing which 
is known by its means. It is in this sense that angels know things through 
signs; and thus one angel speaks to another by means of signs, that is, through 
a species which actuates his intellect and puts it perfectly in relation to the 
other.32
We might summarize the further point made in this passage by saying that 
formal concepts are not just signs but natural signs. For Aquinas words of 
mental language naturally, that is, essentially or by their very intelligible con-
tent, signify their objects—for angels, and for human beings. There does not 
need to be some further account of how the conceptions expressed by the intel-
lect correspond to, signify, or represent their objects, for they bear the same 
form as their objects.33
compositionality, syntactic and semantic
It seems clear that Aquinas is not just calling the concept a “word” because of 
some extraneous theological consideration, but that he regards the concept as 
having language-like properties—formal concepts are intellectual utterances 
or expressions that naturally represent or signify their objects. Still, by the 
standards of Claude Panaccio, who expects a mental language theory to consist 
31. DV 4.1, ad 7.
32. DV 9.4, ad 4.
33. The natural or essential connection between thoughts and their object is the crucial 
point of Thomistic realism, as opposed to nominalism: not whether or not universals or natures 
are “real,” but the role that natures play in guaranteeing a formal identity between knower 
and known. On this see Gyula Klima, “Ontological Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics in 
Medieval Philosophy,” S. European Journal for Semiotic Studies 3 (1991): 587–618.
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in a transposition of grammatical and semantic terminology to the analysis of 
thought,34 Aquinas seems not to have developed a mental language theory, as 
far as formal concepts, the simple qualities of the mind whereby it conceives of 
its objects, are concerned.
A central element of any mental language theory is the position that mental 
propositions exhibit compositionality—they are subject to linguistic analysis 
just insofar as they can be analyzed into their semantic and syntactic compo-
nents. It is reasonable to ask whether Aquinas’s mental language has this feature. 
Perhaps, given Aquinas’s reliance on the notion of a word, one might think that 
what held Aquinas from applying semantic and grammatical analysis to men-
tal language is that the analogy of thought and language did not extend beyond 
individual words and simple concepts. But as we noted earlier, for Aquinas a 
mental “word” is not just a simple concept; a mental proposition is also a “word.”
Indeed, it is at least clear that Aquinas’s mental language exhibits semantic 
compositionality: the semantic values of mental propositions (second acts of 
intellect) are “complex” and can be analyzed in terms of the simpler semantic 
values of (non-propositional) mental words (fi rst acts of intellect), and similar 
considerations apply to the operation of reasoning (third act of intellect). Aqui-
nas did not hesitate to offer such analysis—this is, for him, part in the proper 
business of logic.35 But note that semantic compositionality concerns the infor-
mation content of mental language—which in this case is the objective concepts, 
that which is understood by means of the formal concepts that are the mental 
language. Given that the information content or semantic value of the mental 
word (or formal concept) just is what that mental word signifi es (or the objec-
tive concept), to say that mental language exhibits semantic compositionality 
for Aquinas is just to say that the complex objective concept that is a mental 
proposition, grasped by a second act of intellect, can be analyzed in terms of 
simpler objective concepts that are grasped by fi rst acts of intellect.
But given the distinction between objective and formal concepts, this seman-
tic compositionality does not have to be refl ected on the level of the syntax of 
mental language, on the level of formal concepts. If formal concepts exhibited 
syntactic compositionality, it would mean that the structure of a second act of 
intellect, considered as a quality of mind, could be analyzed in terms of com-
ponent parts, simpler qualities of mind out of which a complex formal concept 
is made. Given Aquinas’s conception of formal concepts, he is not committed 
to, and has principled reasons that count against, the idea that formal concepts 
could exhibit such syntactic compositionality. As immaterial intellectual qual-
ities, formal concepts cannot strictly speaking have structure or sequence or 
34. Panaccio, “Mental Language and Predication,” 184–185.
35.  For a thoroughgoing account of Aquinas’s conception of logic along these lines, see 
Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
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parts; and if they could not have any structure or sequence or parts, then it 
would seem to be a category mistake to subject them to syntactic analysis.36 
Aquinas is clear that the mental act by which a proposition is apprehended is a 
single act, not a combination or composite of many acts.
It may sound odd to insist that the formal concepts that constitute Aquinas’s 
mental language exhibit semantic, but not syntactic, compositionality. But, as 
Gyula Klima has explained, it is possible to attribute semantic complexity to 
ontologically (and so syntactically) simple mental acts, if and insofar as one can 
analyze the semantic value of the simple mental act as dependent on more 
simple semantic values, which more simple semantic values could be attributed 
to other mental acts which are not parts (ontologically, syntactically) of the 
original mental act.37 Consider the mental word that is the result of a second 
act of intellect (judgment, or composition and division), such as “Socrates is 
white.” The formal concept by which it is understood that Socrates is white 
need not, as a quality of the mind, exhibit a structural (syntactic) composition-
ality in order to have as its object (semantic content) the relevant judgment.
To be sure, there may be rules that govern how simple formal concepts can 
be “combined” to create well-formed complex formal concepts; but such rules 
would not be based on the ontological structure of the formal concepts as qual-
ities of mind, rather they will be based on the objects of those formal concepts, 
the semantic values of the item in mental language. One might apply “syntac-
tic” (structural) analysis to a signifi ed complex object (for example, Socrates’ 
being white), but that would in turn lead to an account of the truth conditions 
of the mental act in familiar metaphysical terms (for example, the inherence of 
the form of whiteness in Socrates), not to some further linguistic analysis of 
the formal concepts by means of which Socrates being white is understood. In 
other words, the mental word (formal concept) is just not subject to syntactic 
analysis in its own structure, apart from the object that it (naturally) represents. 
To the extent that the immaterial intellectual quality that is the formal concept 
has an “ontological structure,” it would be analyzed in terms of forms inhering 
in the mind—which would lead to the kind of metaphysical analysis included 
in Aquinas’s philosophical psychology, not to a linguistic analysis that looks 
like a “theory of mental language” or of a “language of thought.”
36. To be sure, the objective concepts (the objects of understanding) may exhibit “syntac-
tic” compositionality—after all, the structure of the object of complex propositional under-
standing may be analyzable into its component parts, such as subject copula, predicate, as the 
notion of propositional thought as “composing and dividing” implies. But such an analysis 
of objective concepts is not a syntactic analysis of mental language, understanding mental 
language as the representational system of formal concepts.
37. See the introduction to Gyula Klima, John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica: An 
Annotated Translation, with a Philosophical Introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2001), xxxvii–xxxix.
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This clarifi cation should help to account for what Robert Pasnau noticed when 
he examined Aquinas’s treatment of thought’s linguistic nature. Pasnau distin-
guished two theses about the language-like character of thought, one semantic 
(that is, the content of thought is linguistic), the other syntactic (that is, the 
structure of thought is linguistic); for Pasnau, it is especially an affi rmation of 
the latter that implies a full-fl edged theory of mental language. Pasnau found 
that Aquinas accepted both the semantic and syntactic theses in only very lim-
ited ways,38 and we are now in a position to see why. Aquinas’s (implicit) distinc-
tion between formal concept (mental word) and objective concept (the ratio of 
the formal concept, the object of awareness signifi ed by the formal concept, or 
in other words, the information content of the formal concept)39 means that for 
Aquinas there is a semantics of mental language (taking mental language to be 
representational system of formal concepts) realized on the level of objective 
concepts, a kind of “concepts” not admitted by Ockham (in his mature theory, 
having abandoned fi cta) and his followers. On the level of the formal concepts 
themselves—the only kind of concept allowed by nominalist semantics—there 
is no relevant syntactic analysis of mental language, considered just in itself 
without reference to objects of thought they naturally signify.
a thomistic theory of mental language
We are now in a better position to characterize the sense in which Aquinas did 
have a conception of mental language, and at the same time why this conception 
is not developed in the direction that more recognizable theories of mental 
language take.
Aquinas undoubtedly considered thought as language-like in relevant ways—
he considered thought (formal concepts) as internally uttered natural signs 
exhibiting semantic compositionality.
But if Thomas had found the notion of “mental language” perfectly accept-
able, a Thomistic “theory of mental language” would have to be crucially dif-
ferent from the kinds of theories described at the beginning of this chapter. For 
one thing, unlike certain contemporary versions of mental language, for Aqui-
nas mental language is not innate. Mental words or concepts may signify their 
objects naturally, but as qualities of the mind they are, like habits, innate only 
potentially; their actuality is acquired, thanks to the process of abstracting the 
intelligible species and the further activity of the possible intellect.
Furthermore, as we have seen, while for Ockham a mental proposition can 
be identical to both an intellectual act and an object of understanding, for Aqui-
nas a word in the mental language is identical with neither. While an actuality 
in its own right, the mental word is described by Aquinas as the terminus of 
38. Robert Pasnau, “Aquinas on Thought’s Linguistic Nature,” Monist 80 (1997): 558–575.
39. For this interpretation of Aquinas’s notion of ratio, see again Gyula Klima’s contribu-
tion to this volume.
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the act of intellect that expresses it. Furthermore, this mental word which is 
produced or “uttered” by an intellectual act is also not itself the object that the 
intellect understands, but is that by which the intellect understands its object.40
Thus, what we in fact fi nd in the way of Aquinas’s own conception of men-
tal language is a realist semantics explaining the meaning and truth value of 
propositions in terms of the forms signifi ed by predicates inhering in the objects 
supposited for by the subject terms. The formal concepts that make up mental 
language are signs, but to the extent that one would feel a need to provide a 
semantic analysis of mental language, it is enough for such analysis to occupy 
itself with an analysis of the objective concepts (and to coincide therefore with 
the logical semantic analysis of uttered speech).
More commonly recognizable and explicit “theories of mental language,” 
involving the semantic and (some sort of) syntactic analysis of (formal) concepts 
in their own right, are not only more appropriate but more necessary within 
an alternative, nominalist approach to language and thought. A Thomistic 
theory of language of thought, however, would have to be fi rmly placed within 
the realm of objective concepts, an ontological realm that Ockham and his fel-
low nominalists completely abandoned.
40. This is thus consistent with O’Callaghan’s treatment of Aquinas in Thomistic Realism 
and the Linguistic Turn, which is critical of the mental language hypothesis, esp. in chap. 4.
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